atlas

Research map / Adversarial robustness and security / Backdoor and poisoning

UFID: A Unified Framework for Black-box Input-level Backdoor Detection on Diffusion Models

AAAI 2025 · Adversarial robustness and security › Backdoor and poisoning · approach: Detecting poisoned samples · 8 citations (OpenAlex)

Read the paperCheck your idea against 108,967 papers

AI-extracted summary. Written by AI from the paper's full text. Numbers and claims can be wrong or missing context, so check the paper before you cite or build on it.

Proposes UFID, a black-box input-level backdoor detector for diffusion models that flags inputs whose perturbed generations are highly similar (high graph density), motivated by a causal analysis and validated on unconditional and conditional models.

Problem

Filtering backdoored inputs at inference time for diffusion models under a Model-as-a-Service setting, where the defender only sees user queries and generated outputs (no weights or architecture), for both unconditional and conditional (text-to-image) generation.

Approach

Backdoor generations stay consistent under small Gaussian perturbations of the input (the trigger-driven spurious causal path dominates), whereas clean generations diversify; UFID perturbs each input, generates a batch, and scores its similarity graph density with a pretrained image encoder to flag backdoors.

Key results

Measured effects reported in the paper

What was changedWhereMeasuredEffect
Use UFID instead of TERD for input-level detectionDDPM on CIFAR10 · CIFAR10AUC: 1.00 vs 1.00No clear effect
Use UFID instead of TERD for input-level detectionDDPM on CelebA · CelebAAUC: 0.99 vs 1.00Hurt
Use UFID instead of Shield for input-level detectionStable Diffusion v1.4 on CelebA-D · CelebA-Dprecision: 0.85 vs 0.88Hurt
Use UFID instead of Shield for input-level detectionStable Diffusion v1.4 on CelebA-D · CelebA-Drecall: 0.84 vs 0.90Hurt
Add prompt-generation correspondence score (ablation)UFID on BadT2I · BadT2I Pixel-, Object-, and Style-backdoorAUC: 0.90, 0.94, 0.86Helped
Replace pretrained encoder similarity with SSIM (ablation)UFID on CIFAR10 · CIFAR10 TrojDiff attacksAUC: 1.00; 0.98; 0.84Mixed
Vary the pretrained image encoder (ablation)UFID on unconditional and conditional backdoor attacks · CIFAR10 and PokemonAUC: 0.64 to 1.00Mixed
Increase magnitude-set size beyond four (ablation)UFID · Backdoor detection across evaluated attacksdetection performanceNo clear effect
Use an exceedingly large clean validation set (ablation)UFID threshold selection · Backdoor detectiondetection performanceHurt
Increase the number of clean validation samples (ablation)UFID threshold selection · Backdoor detectionperformance stabilityHelped
Scale input image size to 64, 128, or 256 (ablation)UFID on CIFAR10 with TrojDiff and BadDiffusion · CIFAR10detection performanceNo clear effect
Vary backdoor poisoning rate from 0.05 to 0.30 (ablation)UFID · Backdoor detection across evaluated attacksdetection performanceNo clear effect

Surprising findings

Limitations

Experimental setup

Datasets: CIFAR10 CelebA CelebA-D Pokemon

Benchmarks: CIFAR10 CelebA CelebA-D Pokemon

Metrics: Precision Recall AUC

Baselines: TERD Shield

Builds on: TERD Shield DDPM Stable Diffusion

Closest papers by meaning

Writing a paper in this area? scime draft is a free LaTeX editor with AI included, real-time co-authors and a check of your references and venue rules before you submit. It also imports OpenAI Prism projects.

Open scime draft

Get the next scime Dispatch and a monthly field update

Free. We send a confirmation link first; every email has a one-click unsubscribe. Privacy