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Research map / Learning theory and algorithms / Submodular and game algorithms

Manipulative Elicitation — A New Attack on Elections with Incomplete Preferences

AAAI 2018 · Learning theory and algorithms › Submodular and game algorithms · approach: Committee voting rules

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Measured effects reported in the paper

What was changedWhereMeasuredEffect
Permit partial elicitation without candidate-pair minimumsMinimax-regret score-based voting · Manipulative elicitationcomputational complexity: polynomial time solvableHelped
Add a minimum-comparability constraint for each candidate pairMinimax-regret score-based voting · Manipulative elicitation with candidate pair limitcomputational complexity: NPCHurt
Apply candidate-pair limitsBorda · Manipulative elicitation with candidate pair limitcomputational complexity: NPCHurt
Apply candidate-pair limitsPlurality · Manipulative elicitation with candidate pair limitcomputational complexity: NPCHurt
Apply candidate-pair limitsMaximin, Copelandα, and simplified Bucklin · Manipulative elicitation with candidate pair limitcomputational complexity: NPCHurt
Partially elicit preferences to retain target-w comparisons against lower-ranked alternativesPlurality minimax regret · Plurality election with incomplete preferencesminimax-regret plurality score: n -> (n-1)Helped

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