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Research map / Learning theory and algorithms / Submodular and game algorithms

On the Distortion of Voting With Multiple Representative Candidates

AAAI 2018 · Learning theory and algorithms › Submodular and game algorithms · approach: Committee voting rules · 14 citations (OpenAlex)

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Measured effects reported in the paper

What was changedWhereMeasuredEffect
Use Borda Count instead of a rule whose limiting score is constant on (0,1)Positional voting with representative candidates · Representative candidatesexpected distortionHelped
Approve a constant fraction of candidates rather than a constant numberk-approval · Representative candidatesexpected distortionHelped
Use Plurality rather than a positional rule with a nonconstant limiting scorePositional voting with representative candidates · Representative candidatesexpected distortionHurt
Use Veto rather than a positional rule with a nonconstant limiting scorePositional voting with representative candidates · Representative candidatesexpected distortionHurt
Use Nauru Dowdall rather than a positional rule with a nonconstant limiting scorePositional voting with representative candidates · Representative candidatesexpected distortionHurt
Use a constant-size approval set rather than approving a constant fractionk-approval · Representative candidatesexpected distortionHurt

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