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Research map / Multi-agent systems and games / Games and equilibria

Selfish Knapsack

Itai Feigenbaum, Matthew Johnson

AAAI 2017 · Multi-agent systems and games › Games and equilibria · approach: Fair division and coalition formation · 3 citations (OpenAlex)

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AI-extracted. The measured effects below were read by AI from the paper's full text (no summary yet). Numbers and claims can be wrong or missing context, so check the paper before you cite or build on it.

Measured effects reported in the paper

What was changedWhereMeasuredEffect
Use HALF-GREEDY in the overstating modelKnapsack mechanism with fake-item reports allowed · Overstating modelworst-case approximation ratio: 2Improved
Require strategyproofness for randomized mechanisms in the overstating modelKnapsack mechanisms · Overstating modelworst-case approximation ratio: 2Hurt
Require deterministic strategyproofness in the overstating modelKnapsack mechanisms · Overstating modelworst-case approximation ratioHurt
Use HALF-GREEDY at equilibriumKnapsack mechanism with hiding-only reports · Understating modelcorrelated price of anarchy: 2Improved
Use HALF-GREEDY when agents do not use malicious strategiesKnapsack mechanism with hiding and fake-item reports · Full modelapproximation ratio at BNE: 2Improved
Constrain the solution to equal expected utilities when single-agent optima are not sufficientEQUAL-UTILITY · Understating model, 2 agentsapproximation ratio: \frac{5+4\sqrt{2}}{7} \approx 1.522Improved
Use EQUAL-UTILITY rather than a deterministic strategyproof mechanismKnapsack mechanism · Understating model, 2 agentsapproximation ratio: \frac{5+4\sqrt{2}}{7} \approx 1.522 versus \phi=\frac{1+\sqrt{5}}{2} \approx 1.618Improved
Use PACIFY-THE-LIAR to select the manipulator's favorite qualifying solutionKnapsack mechanism with all but one agent honest · Understating model, n-1 agents honestapproximation ratio: \phi=\frac{1+\sqrt{5}}{2} \approx 1.618Improved
Adapt HALF-GREEDY by replacing MAXIMUM-VALUE with NEXTKnapsack with known item quality and private size · KQUSapproximation ratio: 2Improved
Require randomized strategyproofness in KQUSKnapsack mechanisms · KQUSworst-case approximation ratio: 2Hurt
Require deterministic strategyproofness in KQUSKnapsack mechanisms · KQUSworst-case approximation ratioHurt

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