Research map / Learning theory and algorithms / Submodular and game algorithms
Private Bayesian Persuasion with Sequential Games
Andrea Celli, Stefano Coniglio, Nicola Gatti
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AI-extracted. The measured effects below were read by AI from the paper's full text (no summary yet). Numbers and claims can be wrong or missing context, so check the paper before you cite or build on it.
Measured effects reported in the paper
| What was changed | Where | Measured | Effect |
|---|---|---|---|
| use ex ante persuasive signaling instead of ex interim persuasive signaling | incumbent-entrant market example · Example 1 | sender expected utility: 0.55 -> 0.7 | Improved |
| relax ex interim persuasiveness to ex ante persuasiveness | signaling schemes · Example 2 with parameter k much larger than 1 | sender expected utility | Improved |
| limit number of receivers to at most 2 | OPT-EA · computational complexity | tractability | Improved |
| increase number of receivers beyond 2 | OPT-EA · computational complexity | tractability | Hurt |
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- Markov Persuasion Processes: Learning to Persuade From Scratch (NeurIPS 2025 · similarity 0.90)
- Computational Aspects of Bayesian Persuasion under Approximate Best Response (NeurIPS 2024 · similarity 0.89)
- Multi-Sender Persuasion: A Computational Perspective (ICML 2024 · similarity 0.89)
- Learning to Persuade a Biased Receiver (NeurIPS 2026 · similarity 0.89)
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