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Learning to Persuade a Biased Receiver
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Studies repeated Bayesian persuasion against a receiver whose belief updating is a linear mix of prior and Bayesian posterior with unknown bias; proposes safe-exploration algorithms achieving O(log log T) regret with a matching lower bound.
Problem
A sender repeatedly designs signaling schemes to persuade a receiver whose updating strength (bias alpha) is fixed but unknown, observing only the receiver's actions, and must minimize regret versus a full-information optimum.
Approach
Exploit the asymmetric cost of probing: probes approached from the safe side lose only a local utility gap, while overly aggressive probes lose the persuasion entirely, so interval-refinement with squared step sizes shrinks the bias interval doubly exponentially; generalized to finite state/action spaces via moving polytope IC constraints.
Key results
- Safe Exploration achieves O(log log T) regret in the binary setting, versus O(log T) for binary search.
- A matching Omega(log log T) lower bound holds for any sender strategy in the binary instance, hence for the general setting too.
- General Safe Exploration runs in polynomial time and achieves O(log log T) regret for arbitrary finite state/action spaces with bounded utilities.
Surprising findings
- Binary search, the natural approach, is suboptimal: it incurs Theta(log T) regret, whereas probing from the safe side achieves doubly-logarithmic regret.
Limitations
- Matching O(log T) upper bound for jointly unknown prior and bias in the general case remains open.
- Analysis assumes exact action feedback; noisy or partial feedback is not covered.
- Constants are instance-dependent and may be large; asymptotic bounds are pointwise in the instance.
Experimental setup
Metrics: cumulative regret
Baselines: binary search
Builds on: Kamenica and Gentzkow Bayesian persuasion linear belief distortion model Kleinberg and Leighton posted-price lower bound Yao's principle
Closest papers by meaning
- Persuasive Prediction via Decision Calibration (NeurIPS 2026 · similarity 0.90)
- Online Bayesian Persuasion Without a Clue (NeurIPS 2024 · similarity 0.89)
- Markov Persuasion Processes: Learning to Persuade From Scratch (NeurIPS 2025 · similarity 0.88)
- Computational Aspects of Bayesian Persuasion under Approximate Best Response (NeurIPS 2024 · similarity 0.86)
- Multi-Sender Persuasion: A Computational Perspective (ICML 2024 · similarity 0.85)
- Bayesian Persuasion with Externalities: Exploiting Agent Types (AAAI 2025 · similarity 0.85)
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