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Learning to Persuade a Biased Receiver

NeurIPS 2026 · Bandits and online learning › Online convex optimization and games · approach: Online decision-making with feedback structure · 0 citations (OpenAlex)

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Studies repeated Bayesian persuasion against a receiver whose belief updating is a linear mix of prior and Bayesian posterior with unknown bias; proposes safe-exploration algorithms achieving O(log log T) regret with a matching lower bound.

Problem

A sender repeatedly designs signaling schemes to persuade a receiver whose updating strength (bias alpha) is fixed but unknown, observing only the receiver's actions, and must minimize regret versus a full-information optimum.

Approach

Exploit the asymmetric cost of probing: probes approached from the safe side lose only a local utility gap, while overly aggressive probes lose the persuasion entirely, so interval-refinement with squared step sizes shrinks the bias interval doubly exponentially; generalized to finite state/action spaces via moving polytope IC constraints.

Key results

Surprising findings

Limitations

Experimental setup

Metrics: cumulative regret

Baselines: binary search

Builds on: Kamenica and Gentzkow Bayesian persuasion linear belief distortion model Kleinberg and Leighton posted-price lower bound Yao's principle

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