% Key papers for Learned auction design (scime atlas, https://atlas.scime.ai). Authors are not included: add them from the paper pages.

@inproceedings{icml2019_optimal_37626,
  title = {{Optimal Auctions through Deep Learning}},
  booktitle = {International Conference on Machine Learning (ICML)},
  year = {2019},
  url = {https://icml.cc/virtual/2019/poster/3967},
}

@inproceedings{aaai2017_mechanism_100964,
  title = {{Mechanism Design in Social Networks}},
  booktitle = {AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI)},
  year = {2017},
  url = {https://ojs.aaai.org/index.php/AAAI/article/view/10605},
}

@inproceedings{neurips2016_sample_55978,
  title = {{Sample Complexity of Automated Mechanism Design}},
  booktitle = {Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems (NeurIPS)},
  year = {2016},
  url = {https://nips.cc/virtual/2016/poster/7013},
}

@inproceedings{aaai2018_muda_101000,
  title = {{MUDA: A Truthful Multi-Unit Double-Auction Mechanism}},
  booktitle = {AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI)},
  year = {2018},
  url = {https://ojs.aaai.org/index.php/AAAI/article/view/11450},
}

@inproceedings{aaai2016_assignment_104765,
  title = {{Assignment and Pricing in Roommate Market}},
  booktitle = {AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI)},
  year = {2016},
  url = {https://ojs.aaai.org/index.php/AAAI/article/view/10019},
}

@inproceedings{aaai2021_poa_1171,
  title = {{PoA of Simple Auctions with Interdependent Values}},
  booktitle = {AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI)},
  year = {2021},
  url = {https://aaai.org/papers/05321-poa-of-simple-auctions-with-interdependent-values/},
}

@inproceedings{aaai2017_probably_100983,
  title = {{Probably Approximately Efficient Combinatorial Auctions via Machine Learning}},
  booktitle = {AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI)},
  year = {2017},
  url = {https://ojs.aaai.org/index.php/AAAI/article/view/10624},
}

@inproceedings{aaai2022_multi_2443,
  title = {{Multi-Unit Auction in Social Networks with Budgets}},
  booktitle = {AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI)},
  year = {2022},
  url = {https://aaai.org/papers/05228-multi-unit-auction-in-social-networks-with-budgets/},
}

@inproceedings{neurips2019_optimal_58762,
  title = {{Optimal Pricing in Repeated Posted-Price Auctions with Different Patience of the Seller and the Buyer}},
  booktitle = {Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems (NeurIPS)},
  year = {2019},
  url = {https://nips.cc/virtual/2019/poster/13323},
}

@inproceedings{aaai2022_signaling_2746,
  title = {{Signaling in Posted Price Auctions}},
  booktitle = {AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI)},
  year = {2022},
  url = {https://aaai.org/papers/04941-signaling-in-posted-price-auctions/},
}

@inproceedings{aaai2023_utility_4926,
  title = {{Utility Maximizer or Value Maximizer: Mechanism Design for Mixed Bidders in Online Advertising}},
  booktitle = {AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI)},
  year = {2023},
  url = {https://ojs.aaai.org/index.php/AAAI/article/view/25718},
}

@inproceedings{neurips2017_dynamic_56273,
  title = {{Dynamic Revenue Sharing}},
  booktitle = {Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems (NeurIPS)},
  year = {2017},
  url = {https://nips.cc/virtual/2017/poster/9054},
}

@inproceedings{neurips2020_hitting_60016,
  title = {{Hitting the High Notes: Subset Selection for Maximizing Expected Order Statistics}},
  booktitle = {Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems (NeurIPS)},
  year = {2020},
  url = {https://nips.cc/virtual/2020/poster/18327},
}

@inproceedings{neurips2021_preferencenet_62635,
  title = {{PreferenceNet: Encoding Human Preferences in Auction Design with Deep Learning}},
  booktitle = {Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems (NeurIPS)},
  year = {2021},
  url = {https://nips.cc/virtual/2021/poster/27429},
}

@inproceedings{aaai2020_mechanism_100897,
  title = {{Mechanism Design with Predicted Task Revenue for Bike Sharing Systems}},
  booktitle = {AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI)},
  year = {2020},
  url = {https://ojs.aaai.org/index.php/AAAI/article/view/5589},
}

@inproceedings{neurips2019_learning_58469,
  title = {{Learning Auctions with Robust Incentive Guarantees}},
  booktitle = {Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems (NeurIPS)},
  year = {2019},
  url = {https://nips.cc/virtual/2019/poster/14141},
}

@inproceedings{aaai2017_randomized_100955,
  title = {{Randomized Mechanisms for Selling Reserved Instances in Cloud}},
  booktitle = {AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI)},
  year = {2017},
  url = {https://ojs.aaai.org/index.php/AAAI/article/view/10596},
}

@inproceedings{aaai2016_optimizing_104762,
  title = {{Optimizing Trading Assignments in Water Right Markets}},
  booktitle = {AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI)},
  year = {2016},
  url = {https://ojs.aaai.org/index.php/AAAI/article/view/10016},
}

@inproceedings{aaai2021_online_1115,
  title = {{Online Posted Pricing with Unknown Time-Discounted Valuations}},
  booktitle = {AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI)},
  year = {2021},
  url = {https://aaai.org/papers/05682-online-posted-pricing-with-unknown-time-discounted-valuations/},
}

@inproceedings{icml2023_statistical_42718,
  title = {{Statistical Inference and A/B Testing for First-Price Pacing Equilibria}},
  booktitle = {International Conference on Machine Learning (ICML)},
  year = {2023},
  url = {https://icml.cc/virtual/2023/poster/25234},
}

@inproceedings{aaai2024_machine_6592,
  title = {{Machine Learning-Powered Combinatorial Clock Auction}},
  booktitle = {AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI)},
  year = {2024},
  url = {https://ojs.aaai.org/index.php/AAAI/article/view/28850},
}

@inproceedings{neurips2024_efficiency_70422,
  title = {{Efficiency of the First-Price Auction in the Autobidding World}},
  booktitle = {Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems (NeurIPS)},
  year = {2024},
  url = {https://neurips.cc/virtual/2024/poster/96683},
}

@inproceedings{aaai2024_simultaneous_7348,
  title = {{Simultaneous Optimization of Bid Shading and Internal Auction for Demand-Side Platforms}},
  booktitle = {AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI)},
  year = {2024},
  url = {https://ojs.aaai.org/index.php/AAAI/article/view/28855},
}

@inproceedings{icml2024_a_43989,
  title = {{A Field Guide for Pacing Budget and ROS Constraints}},
  booktitle = {International Conference on Machine Learning (ICML)},
  year = {2024},
  url = {https://icml.cc/virtual/2024/poster/34463},
}

@inproceedings{neurips2024_sample_71188,
  title = {{Sample Complexity of Posted Pricing for a Single Item}},
  booktitle = {Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems (NeurIPS)},
  year = {2024},
  url = {https://neurips.cc/virtual/2024/poster/96043},
}

@inproceedings{aaai2024_strategic_7422,
  title = {{Strategic Recommendation: Revenue Optimal Matching for Online Platforms (Student Abstract)}},
  booktitle = {AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI)},
  year = {2024},
  url = {https://ojs.aaai.org/index.php/AAAI/article/view/30432},
}

@inproceedings{aaai2025_increasing_9557,
  title = {{Increasing Revenue in Efficient Combinatorial Auctions by Learning to Generate Artificial Competition}},
  booktitle = {AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI)},
  year = {2025},
  url = {https://ojs.aaai.org/index.php/AAAI/article/view/33482},
}

@inproceedings{aaai2025_merging_9941,
  title = {{Merging Mechanisms for Ads and Organic Items in E-commerce Platforms}},
  booktitle = {AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI)},
  year = {2025},
  url = {https://ojs.aaai.org/index.php/AAAI/article/view/33479},
}

@inproceedings{aaai2025_on_10165,
  title = {{On Designing the Optimal Integrated Ad Auction in E-commerce Platforms}},
  booktitle = {AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI)},
  year = {2025},
  url = {https://ojs.aaai.org/index.php/AAAI/article/view/33347},
}

@inproceedings{icml2024_equilibrium_44423,
  title = {{Equilibrium of Data Markets with Externality}},
  booktitle = {International Conference on Machine Learning (ICML)},
  year = {2024},
  url = {https://icml.cc/virtual/2024/poster/34029},
}

@inproceedings{aaai2025_learning_9742,
  title = {{Learning Optimal Auctions with Correlated Value Distributions}},
  booktitle = {AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI)},
  year = {2025},
  url = {https://ojs.aaai.org/index.php/AAAI/article/view/33525},
}

@inproceedings{aaai2025_on_10181,
  title = {{On the Power of Randomization for Obviously Strategy-Proof Mechanisms}},
  booktitle = {AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI)},
  year = {2025},
  url = {https://ojs.aaai.org/index.php/AAAI/article/view/33540},
}

@inproceedings{aaai2025_optimal_10208,
  title = {{Optimal Auction Design for Mixed Bidders}},
  booktitle = {AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI)},
  year = {2025},
  url = {https://ojs.aaai.org/index.php/AAAI/article/view/33487},
}

@inproceedings{icml2024_bootstrapping_44316,
  title = {{Bootstrapping Fisher Market Equilibrium and First-Price Pacing Equilibrium}},
  booktitle = {International Conference on Machine Learning (ICML)},
  year = {2024},
  url = {https://icml.cc/virtual/2024/poster/34136},
}

@inproceedings{icml2025_optimal_45910,
  title = {{Optimal Auction Design in the Joint Advertising}},
  booktitle = {International Conference on Machine Learning (ICML)},
  year = {2025},
  url = {https://icml.cc/virtual/2025/poster/46634},
}

@inproceedings{icml2025_prices_46081,
  title = {{Prices, Bids, Values: One ML-Powered Combinatorial Auction to Rule Them All}},
  booktitle = {International Conference on Machine Learning (ICML)},
  year = {2025},
  url = {https://icml.cc/virtual/2025/poster/46478},
}

@inproceedings{icml2026_from_49334,
  title = {{From Welfare to Utility: Generalized Objectives in Budget-Feasible Procurement}},
  booktitle = {International Conference on Machine Learning (ICML)},
  year = {2026},
  url = {https://openreview.net/forum?id=1Uvqz8NQ5z},
}

@inproceedings{icml2026_enhancing_52147,
  title = {{Enhancing Affine Maximizer Auctions with Correlation-Aware Payment}},
  booktitle = {International Conference on Machine Learning (ICML)},
  year = {2026},
  url = {https://openreview.net/forum?id=TA3NDHgNJh},
}

@inproceedings{icml2026_budget_53697,
  title = {{Budget-Feasible Mechanisms for Submodular Welfare Maximization in Procurement Auctions}},
  booktitle = {International Conference on Machine Learning (ICML)},
  year = {2026},
  url = {https://openreview.net/forum?id=hqFugMmCqJ},
}

@inproceedings{icml2026_model_55004,
  title = {{Model Monotonicity in Autobidding Auctions: When Do Better Predictions Lead to Better Outcomes?}},
  booktitle = {International Conference on Machine Learning (ICML)},
  year = {2026},
  url = {https://openreview.net/forum?id=uiw8P2JGbW},
}