% Key papers for Fair division of indivisible goods (scime atlas, https://atlas.scime.ai). Authors are not included: add them from the paper pages. @inproceedings{aaai2016_when_104787, title = {{When Can the Maximin Share Guarantee Be Guaranteed?}}, booktitle = {AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI)}, year = {2016}, url = {https://ojs.aaai.org/index.php/AAAI/article/view/10041}, } @inproceedings{aaai2017_algorithms_100941, title = {{Algorithms for Max-Min Share Fair Allocation of Indivisible Chores}}, booktitle = {AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI)}, year = {2017}, url = {https://ojs.aaai.org/index.php/AAAI/article/view/10582}, } @inproceedings{aaai2021_fair_596, title = {{Fair and Truthful Mechanisms for Dichotomous Valuations}}, booktitle = {AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI)}, year = {2021}, url = {https://aaai.org/papers/05119-fair-and-truthful-mechanisms-for-dichotomous-valuations/}, } @inproceedings{aaai2018_groupwise_101013, title = {{Groupwise Maximin Fair Allocation of Indivisible Goods}}, booktitle = {AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI)}, year = {2018}, url = {https://ojs.aaai.org/index.php/AAAI/article/view/11463}, } @inproceedings{aaai2022_fair_2084, title = {{Fair and Efficient Allocations of Chores under Bivalued Preferences}}, booktitle = {AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI)}, year = {2022}, url = {https://aaai.org/papers/05043-fair-and-efficient-allocations-of-chores-under-bivalued-preferences/}, } @inproceedings{aaai2018_the_101034, title = {{The Conference Paper Assignment Problem: Using Order Weighted Averages to Assign Indivisible Goods}}, booktitle = {AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI)}, year = {2018}, url = {https://ojs.aaai.org/index.php/AAAI/article/view/11484}, } @inproceedings{aaai2021_fair_593, title = {{Fair and Efficient Allocations under Subadditive Valuations}}, booktitle = {AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI)}, year = {2021}, url = {https://aaai.org/papers/05269-fair-and-efficient-allocations-under-subadditive-valuations/}, } @inproceedings{aaai2020_price_100902, title = {{Price of Fairness in Budget Division and Probabilistic Social Choice}}, booktitle = {AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI)}, year = {2020}, url = {https://ojs.aaai.org/index.php/AAAI/article/view/5594}, } @inproceedings{aaai2017_envy_100943, title = {{Envy-Free Mechanisms with Minimum Number of Cuts}}, booktitle = {AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI)}, year = {2017}, url = {https://ojs.aaai.org/index.php/AAAI/article/view/10584}, } @inproceedings{aaai2018_balancing_100986, title = {{Balancing Lexicographic Fairness and a Utilitarian Objective With Application to Kidney Exchange}}, booktitle = {AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI)}, year = {2018}, url = {https://ojs.aaai.org/index.php/AAAI/article/view/11436}, } @inproceedings{aaai2022_truthful_2892, title = {{Truthful and Fair Mechanisms for Matroid-Rank Valuations}}, booktitle = {AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI)}, year = {2022}, url = {https://aaai.org/papers/04801-truthful-and-fair-mechanisms-for-matroid-rank-valuations/}, } @inproceedings{aaai2016_an_104788, title = {{An Algorithmic Framework for Strategic Fair Division}}, booktitle = {AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI)}, year = {2016}, url = {https://ojs.aaai.org/index.php/AAAI/article/view/10042}, } @inproceedings{aaai2017_complexity_100945, title = {{Complexity of Manipulating Sequential Allocation}}, booktitle = {AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI)}, year = {2017}, url = {https://ojs.aaai.org/index.php/AAAI/article/view/10586}, } @inproceedings{aaai2021_fair_592, title = {{Fair and Efficient Allocations under Lexicographic Preferences}}, booktitle = {AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI)}, year = {2021}, url = {https://aaai.org/papers/05472-fair-and-efficient-allocations-under-lexicographic-preferences/}, } @inproceedings{neurips2019_envy_58217, title = {{Envy-Free Classification}}, booktitle = {Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems (NeurIPS)}, year = {2019}, url = {https://nips.cc/virtual/2019/poster/13346}, } @inproceedings{aaai2022_weighted_2947, title = {{Weighted Fairness Notions for Indivisible Items Revisited}}, booktitle = {AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI)}, year = {2022}, url = {https://aaai.org/papers/04949-weighted-fairness-notions-for-indivisible-items-revisited/}, } @inproceedings{aaai2021_achieving_74, title = {{Achieving Envy-freeness and Equitability with Monetary Transfers}}, booktitle = {AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI)}, year = {2021}, url = {https://aaai.org/papers/05102-achieving-envy-freeness-and-equitability-with-monetary-transfers/}, } @inproceedings{aaai2021_on_1086, title = {{On Fair and Efficient Allocations of Indivisible Goods}}, booktitle = {AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI)}, year = {2021}, url = {https://aaai.org/papers/05595-on-fair-and-efficient-allocations-of-indivisible-goods/}, } @inproceedings{aaai2024_mixed_6651, title = {{Mixed Fair Division: A Survey}}, booktitle = {AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI)}, year = {2024}, url = {https://ojs.aaai.org/index.php/AAAI/article/view/30274}, } @inproceedings{aaai2024_on_6826, title = {{On Optimal Tradeoffs between EFX and Nash Welfare}}, booktitle = {AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI)}, year = {2024}, url = {https://ojs.aaai.org/index.php/AAAI/article/view/28826}, } @inproceedings{aaai2024_almost_5163, title = {{Almost Envy-Free Allocations of Indivisible Goods or Chores with Entitlements}}, booktitle = {AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI)}, year = {2024}, url = {https://ojs.aaai.org/index.php/AAAI/article/view/28851}, } @inproceedings{aaai2024_maximizing_6613, title = {{Maximizing Nash Social Welfare under Two-Sided Preferences}}, booktitle = {AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI)}, year = {2024}, url = {https://ojs.aaai.org/index.php/AAAI/article/view/28839}, } @inproceedings{aaai2024_repeated_7111, title = {{Repeated Fair Allocation of Indivisible Items}}, booktitle = {AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI)}, year = {2024}, url = {https://ojs.aaai.org/index.php/AAAI/article/view/28837}, } @inproceedings{aaai2024_weighted_7801, title = {{Weighted Envy-Freeness for Submodular Valuations}}, booktitle = {AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI)}, year = {2024}, url = {https://ojs.aaai.org/index.php/AAAI/article/view/28847}, } @inproceedings{aaai2025_epistemic_9003, title = {{Epistemic EFX Allocations Exist for Monotone Valuations}}, booktitle = {AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI)}, year = {2025}, url = {https://ojs.aaai.org/index.php/AAAI/article/view/33476}, } @inproceedings{aaai2024_envy_5870, title = {{Envy-Free House Allocation under Uncertain Preferences}}, booktitle = {AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI)}, year = {2024}, url = {https://ojs.aaai.org/index.php/AAAI/article/view/28802}, } @inproceedings{aaai2024_towards_7612, title = {{Towards Optimal Subsidy Bounds for Envy-Freeable Allocations}}, booktitle = {AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI)}, year = {2024}, url = {https://ojs.aaai.org/index.php/AAAI/article/view/28842}, } @inproceedings{aaai2024_greedy_6163, title = {{Greedy-Based Online Fair Allocation with Adversarial Input: Enabling Best-of-Many-Worlds Guarantees}}, booktitle = {AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI)}, year = {2024}, url = {https://ojs.aaai.org/index.php/AAAI/article/view/28858}, } @inproceedings{aaai2024_reachability_7068, title = {{Reachability of Fair Allocations via Sequential Exchanges}}, booktitle = {AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI)}, year = {2024}, url = {https://ojs.aaai.org/index.php/AAAI/article/view/28836}, } @inproceedings{aaai2025_proportionally_10385, title = {{Proportionally Fair Makespan Approximation}}, booktitle = {AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI)}, year = {2025}, url = {https://ojs.aaai.org/index.php/AAAI/article/view/33513}, } @inproceedings{aaai2026_existence_106431, title = {{Existence of 2-EFX Allocations of Chores}}, booktitle = {AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI)}, year = {2026}, url = {https://ojs.aaai.org/index.php/AAAI/article/view/38738}, } @inproceedings{aaai2024_approximation_5202, title = {{Approximation Algorithms for Preference Aggregation Using CP-Nets}}, booktitle = {AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI)}, year = {2024}, url = {https://ojs.aaai.org/index.php/AAAI/article/view/28911}, } @inproceedings{aaai2024_nearly_6753, title = {{Nearly Equitable Allocations beyond Additivity and Monotonicity}}, booktitle = {AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI)}, year = {2024}, url = {https://ojs.aaai.org/index.php/AAAI/article/view/28804}, } @inproceedings{aaai2024_non_6785, title = {{Non-excludable Bilateral Trade between Groups}}, booktitle = {AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI)}, year = {2024}, url = {https://ojs.aaai.org/index.php/AAAI/article/view/28857}, } @inproceedings{aaai2025_constrained_8508, title = {{Constrained Fair and Efficient Allocations}}, booktitle = {AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI)}, year = {2025}, url = {https://ojs.aaai.org/index.php/AAAI/article/view/33499}, } @inproceedings{aaai2025_improved_9519, title = {{Improved Maximin Share Approximations for Chores by Bin Packing}}, booktitle = {AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI)}, year = {2025}, url = {https://ojs.aaai.org/index.php/AAAI/article/view/33518}, } @inproceedings{aaai2025_temporal_10941, title = {{Temporal Fair Division}}, booktitle = {AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI)}, year = {2025}, url = {https://ojs.aaai.org/index.php/AAAI/article/view/33500}, } @inproceedings{aaai2025_the_10966, title = {{The (Exact) Price of Cardinality for Indivisible Goods: A Parametric Perspective}}, booktitle = {AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI)}, year = {2025}, url = {https://ojs.aaai.org/index.php/AAAI/article/view/33530}, }