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J&H: Evaluating the Robustness of Large Language Models Under Knowledge-Injection Attacks in Legal Domain

AAAI 2025 · Large language models › Retrieval and knowledge · approach: Knowledge-augmented question answering · 3 citations (OpenAlex)

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Proposes J&H, a syllogism-based legal knowledge-injection attack benchmark that perturbs major premise, minor premise, and conclusion of criminal judgment tasks, showing LLMs are fragile and prompt-level defenses only partially help.

Problem

Whether LLMs make legal judgments through domain knowledge and deductive reasoning, or are misled by surface words, patterns, and irrelevant logic chains when facing knowledge-level perturbations.

Approach

Attacks legal reasoning at each syllogism level (major premise via inserted wrong statutes and similar-crime mentions; minor premise via legal synonym substitution, element insertion, and narration; conclusion via expert-opinion and prior-behavior insertions), measuring accuracy drop (PDR) on multiple-choice crime prediction, and tests RAG, CoT, and few-shot as mitigations.

Key results

Measured effects reported in the paper

What was changedWhereMeasuredEffect
Insert legal elements from a similar crime into the case factsLLMs evaluated by J&H · LEVENaccuracy: 0.777 -> 0.534; 0.734 -> 0.644; 0.671 -> 0.596; 0.679 -> 0.430; 0.849 -> 0.746Hurt
Insert an opinion that a judge favors a similar crimeLLMs evaluated by J&H · LEVENaccuracy: 0.777 -> 0.627; 0.734 -> 0.52; 0.671 -> 0.478; 0.679 -> 0.379; 0.849 -> 0.555Hurt
Use a domain-specific legal model rather than general-domain modelsLEVEN legal judgment prediction · LEVENaccuracy (original): Farui 0.849; general models 0.777, 0.734, 0.671, 0.679Helped
Add retrieved legal provisions to the promptBaichuan2, ChatGLM3, LLaMA3, and Farui · LEVENPDR, provisional element attack: 31.27% -> 15.83%; 12.26% -> 5.40%; 36.67% -> 12.59%; 12.13% -> 11.49%Helped
Ask for step-by-step reasoning using the four criminal-law elementsBaichuan2, ChatGLM3, LLaMA3, and Farui · LEVENPDR, provisional element attack: 31.27% -> 33.42%; 12.26% -> 10.71%; 36.67% -> 33.72%; 12.13% -> 15.14%Mixed
Add two typical crime and similar-crime examplesBaichuan2, ChatGLM3, LLaMA3, and Farui · LEVENPDR, provisional element attack: 31.27% -> 3.17%; 12.26% -> 6.22%; 36.67% -> 33.06%; 12.13% -> 27.29%Mixed
Add legal-element attack rather than factual-element attackLLMs evaluated by J&H · LEVENPDR: Baichuan2 12.36% -> 31.27%; ChatGLM3 5.18% -> 12.26%; GPT3.5 2.98% -> 11.18%; LLaMA3 17.53% -> 36.67%; Farui 4.95% -> 12Helped

Surprising findings

Limitations

Experimental setup

Datasets: LEVEN CAIL2018

Benchmarks: LEVEN CAIL2018

Metrics: accuracy performance drop ratio (PDR)

Baselines: GPT-3.5-turbo Baichuan2-7B-chat ChatGLM3-6B LLaMA3 Farui

Builds on: PromptBench retrieval-augmented generation chain-of-thought LEVEN CAIL2018

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