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Simple yet Effective Budget-Feasible Procurement Auctions for Submodular Welfare Maximization

Junxiang Zhang, Qingchun HE, Xinhui Lu, Yaxin Hu, Feng Li, Jing Tang, Kai Han

NeurIPS 2026 · Learning theory and algorithms › Submodular and game algorithms · approach: Monotone submodular maximization

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Proposes a simple single-round clock auction for budget-feasible procurement with submodular valuations to maximize social welfare.

Problem

Budget-feasible procurement auctions for social-welfare maximization under submodular valuations, where a buyer with limited payment budget procures from strategic sellers with private costs.

Approach

A simple single-round clock auction in which each seller receives at most a bounded payment, aiming to be truthful, budget-feasible, and effective for submodular welfare maximization.

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