Research map / Learning theory and algorithms / Submodular and game algorithms
Simple yet Effective Budget-Feasible Procurement Auctions for Submodular Welfare Maximization
Junxiang Zhang, Qingchun HE, Xinhui Lu, Yaxin Hu, Feng Li, Jing Tang, Kai Han
Read the paperCheck your idea against 137,217 papers
AI-extracted summary. Written by AI from the paper's abstract only. Numbers and claims can be wrong or missing context, so check the paper before you cite or build on it.
Proposes a simple single-round clock auction for budget-feasible procurement with submodular valuations to maximize social welfare.
Problem
Budget-feasible procurement auctions for social-welfare maximization under submodular valuations, where a buyer with limited payment budget procures from strategic sellers with private costs.
Approach
A simple single-round clock auction in which each seller receives at most a bounded payment, aiming to be truthful, budget-feasible, and effective for submodular welfare maximization.
Closest papers by meaning
- Procurement Auctions via Approximately Optimal Submodular Optimization (ICML 2025 · similarity 0.92)
- Multidimensional Bayesian Utility Maximization: Tight Approximations to Welfare (NeurIPS 2025 · similarity 0.87)
- Sample Complexity of Posted Pricing for a Single Item (NeurIPS 2024 · similarity 0.87)
- Fair Allocation in Dynamic Mechanism Design (NeurIPS 2024 · similarity 0.87)
- A Unified Framework for Uniform-Price Resource Allocation Mechanisms (NeurIPS 2026 · similarity 0.86)
- 1/2-Approximate MMS Allocation for Separable Piecewise Linear Concave Valuations (AAAI 2024 · similarity 0.86)
Writing a paper in this area? scime draft is a free LaTeX editor with AI included, real-time co-authors and a check of your references and venue rules before you submit. It also imports OpenAI Prism projects.
