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GT-HarmBench: Benchmarking AI Safety Risks Through the Lens of Game Theory
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Introduces GT-HarmBench, 1,535 game-theoretic scenarios grounded in MIT AI Risk Repository risks, evaluates 15 frontier models on socially optimal choice, analyzes framing/order/reasoning effects, and tests five mechanism-design interventions.
Problem
Existing AI safety benchmarks evaluate single agents, leaving multi-agent risks such as coordination failure and conflict under-measured, especially in high-stakes real-world contexts.
Approach
Map real-world AI risks from the MIT AI Risk Repository onto six canonical symmetric 2x2 games (Prisoner's Dilemma, Chicken, Stag Hunt, Battle of the Sexes, Coordination, No Conflict), generate LLM-written scenarios with explicit payoffs, and measure whether models pick welfare-maximizing actions, with mechanism-design prompts as interventions.
Key results
- Across 15 frontier models, models achieve socially optimal outcomes in only 62% of scenarios (38% failure rate).
- Prisoner's Dilemma cooperation is lowest at 44%, while Chicken reaches 80% prosocial outcomes.
- Mechanism interventions raise utilitarian accuracy by +0.13 (Contracts) to +0.18 (Mediator) over a 0.59 baseline.
Surprising findings
- Surfacing explicit payoffs shifts models toward Nash play and lowers utilitarian accuracy by about 4%.
- Mechanism interventions that improve welfare (payments, penalties, mediator) reduce Nash accuracy below baseline.
Limitations
- Restricted to symmetric 2x2 games, excluding asymmetric, sequential and n-player settings.
- Third-party advisory framing rather than first-person agentic action.
- Risk severity and scenario labels are LLM-generated and only partially validated (human study of 30 scenarios).
Experimental setup
Datasets: MIT AI Risk Repository
Benchmarks: GT-HarmBench
Metrics: utilitarian accuracy Nash accuracy Rawlsian welfare Nash social welfare
Baselines: GTBench TMGBench CoopEval GovSim
Builds on: MIT AI Risk Repository GovSim CoopEval GTBench
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