Research map / Learning theory and algorithms / Fairness
Balancing Bias in Two-sided Markets for Fair Stable Matchings
Siyuan Wu, Leong Hou U, Panagiotis Karras
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Studies the Balanced Stable Marriage problem and proposes an approximate approach for finding stable matchings that minimize the maximum dissatisfaction across the two sides in a two-sided market.
Problem
The Balanced Stable Marriage (BSM) problem: finding a stable matching in a two-sided market that minimizes the maximum dissatisfaction between the two sides; NP-hard, while Deferred Acceptance yields unfair stable matchings.
Approach
Targets the NP-hard BSM problem with approximation methods rather than exact solvers, aiming to balance bias between the two sides of a stable matching. Details beyond the abstract are not available.
Experimental setup
Baselines: Deferred Acceptance
Builds on: Deferred Acceptance
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