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Train to Defend: First Defense Against Cryptanalytic Neural Network Parameter Extraction Attacks

NeurIPS 2025 · Adversarial robustness and security › Attacks on text and graphs · approach: Membership inference and inversion · 0 citations (OpenAlex)

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Proposes extraction-aware training, adding an intra-layer neuron weight similarity regularizer to the loss, as the first defense against cryptanalytic ReLU MLP parameter extraction attacks, with zero inference overhead and a theoretical attack-success bound.

Problem

Cryptanalytic parameter extraction attacks can recover ReLU MLP weights from black-box queries in polynomial time, and no countermeasure existed; prior attack evaluations also used an arbitrary runtime threshold to define success.

Approach

Add a regularization term to the training loss that minimizes pairwise distances between neuron weights within a layer, making neurons activate together so the signature extraction cannot isolate individual neurons; also derive a probability bound on attack success as a function of neuron dissimilarity.

Key results

Measured effects reported in the paper

What was changedWhereMeasuredEffect
Add intra-layer neuron similarity regularization during trainingMNIST784-16x8-1 (s2) · MNIST784-16x8-1 (s2)attack success probability: 0.74 -> 0.0017Helped
Add intra-layer neuron similarity regularization during trainingMNIST784-16x8-1 (s2) · MNIST784-16x8-1 (s2)accuracy change (%): -0.92Mixed
Add intra-layer neuron similarity regularization during trainingMNIST784-16x3-1 (s1) · MNIST784-16x3-1 (s1)accuracy change (%): +0.43Helped
Add intra-layer neuron similarity regularization during trainingPreviously studied attack settings · Cryptanalytic parameter extractionextraction resistance: 48 hoursHelped
Protect only the first layer with similarity regularizationLayer-wise cryptanalytic extraction · Subsequent-layer parameter extractionattack successHelped

Surprising findings

Limitations

Experimental setup

Datasets: MNIST random data

Benchmarks: MNIST

Metrics: test accuracy change (%) signature extraction time (s) sign extraction time (s) number of queries attack success probability

Baselines: Carlini et al. signature extraction Canales-Martinez et al. sign extraction Foerster et al. end-to-end extraction

Builds on: cryptanalytic signature extraction (Carlini et al.) sign recovery (Canales-Martinez et al.) end-to-end extraction (Foerster et al.)

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