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MARS: A Malignity-Aware Backdoor Defense in Federated Learning

NeurIPS 2025 · Federated learning and privacy › Privacy attacks and secure learning · approach: Defending federated learning against poisoning · 1 citations (OpenAlex)

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Proposes MARS, a federated learning backdoor defense that scores neurons by a Lipschitz-based backdoor energy, keeps the top values per layer as a concentrated backdoor energy vector, and clusters clients with a Wasserstein-distance K-means variant.

Problem

Existing FL backdoor defenses rely on empirical statistics (norm, OOD distance, cosine consistency) that are loosely coupled with backdoor intent, so SOTA attacks such as 3DFed, CerP and DarkFed evade them.

Approach

Measure each neuron's backdoor energy via an upper bound equal to its Lipschitz constant (computable from weights alone, no data or trigger), keep the top-κ% values per layer as a concentrated backdoor energy vector, and cluster these vectors with K-means under Wasserstein distance, which is insensitive to element order; cluster selection uses center norm and an inter-cluster distance threshold.

Key results

Measured effects reported in the paper

What was changedWhereMeasuredEffect
use MARS instead of FedCLPCIFAR-10 federated learning under 3DFed · CIFAR-10, 3DFedCAD: 80.85 -> 93.80Helped
use MARS instead of FedCLPMNIST federated learning under 3DFed · MNIST, 3DFedCAD: 84.43 -> 96.45Helped
use MARS instead of FedCLPCIFAR-100 federated learning under 3DFed · CIFAR-100, 3DFedCAD: 88.37 -> 94.60Helped
replace Wasserstein distance with Euclidean distance for clustering (ablation)MARS · CIFAR-10, CerPCAD: close to 94% -> around 44%Hurt
replace Wasserstein distance with cosine distance for clustering (ablation)MARS · CIFAR-10, CerPCAD: close to 94% -> around 44%Hurt
replace smaller-center-norm cluster selection with majority-based selection (ablation)MARS under adaptive attack with λ=0.05 · CIFAR-10, adaptive attack, λ=0.05CAD: 3.13 -> 93.96Helped
replace smaller-center-norm cluster selection with majority-based selection (ablation)MARS under adaptive attack with λ=0.1 · CIFAR-10, adaptive attack, λ=0.1CAD: 2.66 -> 93.96Helped
increase adaptive-attack regularization coefficient to 0.05 or higher while retaining the original cluster selectionMARS · CIFAR-10, adaptive attackCAD: 93.92 -> 3.13; 93.92 -> 2.66Hurt
increase the attacker proportion from 20 to 95MARS · CIFAR-10, 3DFedCAD: 93.80 -> 92.89Hurt

Surprising findings

Limitations

Experimental setup

Datasets: MNIST CIFAR-10 CIFAR-100

Benchmarks: MNIST CIFAR-10 CIFAR-100

Metrics: ACC ASR TPR FPR CAD

Baselines: FedAvg Multi-Krum RFLBAT FLAME FoolsGold FLDetector DeepSight FedCLP BackdoorIndicator

Builds on: CLP 3DFed FLAME Multi-Krum FedAvg

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