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Mitigating Sexual Content Generation via Embedding Distortion in Text-conditioned Diffusion Models

NeurIPS 2025 · Adversarial robustness and security › Attacks on text and graphs · approach: Vision-language model robustness · 1 citations (OpenAlex)

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Proposes Distorting Embedding Space (DES), a text-encoder fine-tuning defense that pushes unsafe prompt embeddings toward nudity-anticorrelated safe targets while preserving safe embeddings and neutralizing the nudity concept, to block sexual content in diffusion models.

Problem

Text-conditioned diffusion models can generate sexual content, and existing defenses (prompt filters, concept removal, sexual content mitigation) are either bypassed by adversarial prompts or degrade benign image quality.

Approach

Instead of erasing concepts from the U-Net, fine-tune only the text encoder so unsafe embeddings are mapped to safe target vectors (the most dissimilar safe embedding minus a nudity direction), safe embeddings are preserved with a nudity-adjusted loss, and the nudity embedding is aligned with the neutral embedding.

Key results

Measured effects reported in the paper

What was changedWhereMeasuredEffect
Use DES embedding distortion instead of AdvUnlearnSDv1.5 text-conditioned T2I · Black-box adversarial promptsAvg. ASR (%): 1.44 -> 0.52Helped
Use DES embedding distortion instead of EraseAnythingFLUX.1 text-conditioned T2I · Black-box adversarial promptsAvg. ASR (%): 43.23 -> 8.86Helped
Use DES embedding distortion instead of AdvUnlearnSDv1.5 text-conditioned T2I · I2P explicit sexual contentFID: 18.94 -> 15.44Helped
Apply DES rather than AdvUnlearnSDv1.5 text-conditioned T2I · White-box adaptive attacksAvg. ASR (%): 7.15 -> 6.47Helped
Add DES embedding distortionSDv1.5 T2I · Black-box adversarial prompts with negative promptsAvg. ASR (%): 78.04 -> 0.33Helped
Add filtering to DESSDv1.5 T2I · Black-box adversarial promptsAvg. ASR (%): 0.52 -> 0.33Helped

Surprising findings

Limitations

Experimental setup

Datasets: CoPro I2P MMA-Diffusion prompts Sneaky prompts Ring-A-Bell prompts P4D prompts UDA prompts CCE prompts COCO 30k

Benchmarks: I2P Sneaky MMA-Diffusion Ring-A-Bell P4D UDA CCE COCO

Metrics: attack success rate FID CLIP score PickScore ImageReward BLIP score

Baselines: SPM SLD Safe-CLIP SAFREE UCE ESD GLoCE SalUn AdvUnlearn EraseAnything GuardT2I Latent Guard

Builds on: AdvUnlearn ESD SalUn Safe-CLIP

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