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Dynamic Service Fee Pricing under Strategic Behavior: Actions as Instruments and Phase Transition

NeurIPS 2024 · Bandits and online learning › Online convex optimization and games · approach: Learning for pricing and auctions · 0 citations (OpenAlex)

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Studies dynamic service-fee pricing against far-sighted strategic buyers, using non-i.i.d. actions as instrumental variables, active randomness injection and low-switching updates to get e O(1) regret when supply is noisy and e O(sqrt T) otherwise, with a phase transition at supply variance ~1/sqrt(T).

Problem

Revenue-maximizing service-fee pricing on a third-party platform when only equilibrium prices and quantities are observed (confounded by supply and demand shocks), and the representative buyer is far-sighted and may misreport her demand.

Approach

Uses the platform's own service-fee actions (non-i.i.d., endogenous) as instrumental variables to consistently estimate a linear demand curve from equilibrium data; injects exploration noise only when supply is deterministic; uses low-switching (doubling-episode) updates to make far-sighted buyers nearly truthful; supply randomness itself provides exploration, yielding a phase transition in regret

Key results

Measured effects reported in the paper

What was changedWhereMeasuredEffect
Use AaI with supply randomness instead of the deterministic-supply settingAaI · Dynamic service-fee pricingregret: O(√T) to O(log T)Helped
Use AAaI to adapt to unknown supply randomnessDynamic service-fee pricing · Unknown supply randomnessexpected regret: eO(√T ∧ σ−2S)Helped
Increase supply varianceAaI · SimulationregretHelped
Apply the low-switching pricing policy to strategic buyersAaI · Dynamic service-fee pricing with γ ∈ [0, 1)regret: O(log T/(σ²S(1−γ)))Helped

Surprising findings

Limitations

Experimental setup

Benchmarks: simulated linear pricing environment (T=10^5 and T=10^4)

Metrics: cumulative revenue regret log-regret slope

Baselines: Golrezaei et al. repeated auction pricing Amin et al. (no-regret impossibility for patient buyers)

Builds on: Nambiar et al. instrumental variable demand learning Golrezaei et al. strategic buyer pricing Amin et al. patient buyer lower bound Broder and Rusmevichientong dynamic pricing

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