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Maxileximin Envy Allocations and Connected Goods

AAAI 2024 · Multi-agent systems and games › Games and equilibria · approach: Fair division and coalition formation · 1 citations (OpenAlex)

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Introduces maxileximin allocations (leximin over agents' maximum envy, tie-broken by maximum social welfare) for connected fair division of indivisible goods, and studies their computational complexity.

Problem

Fair allocation of indivisible goods when envy-free allocations may not exist and goods must form connected bundles on a graph; the goal is an always-existing fair and efficient allocation.

Approach

Define fairness as lexicographic minimization of the sorted envy vector (agents' dissatisfaction = maximum envy), with social welfare maximization as a tie-breaker, giving maxileximin allocations that always exist; analyze their complexity under connectivity constraints.

Key results

Surprising findings

Limitations

Experimental setup

Builds on: Nucleolus connected fair division (Bouveret et al. 2017) OWA envy minimization (Shams et al. 2021) treewidth

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