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TuCo: Measuring the Contribution of Fine-Tuning to Individual Responses of LLMs

ICML 2025 · Large language models › Instruction and fine-tuning · approach: Efficient LLM fine-tuning systems · 0 citations (OpenAlex)

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Proposes TuCo, an inference-time metric that decomposes a fine-tuned LLM's residual stream into pre-training and fine-tuning components and reports the fine-tuning share of the last token's representation, showing jailbreaks reduce it.

Problem

Existing analyses of fine-tuning effects are aggregate (benchmark-level) or model-specific; there is no quantitative per-prompt measure of how much fine-tuning contributes to an individual LLM response.

Approach

Exactly decompose each layer's output of a fine-tuned transformer into a pre-training component (the pre-trained layer's output) and a fine-tuning component (fine-tuned minus pre-trained layer output); define TuCo as the norm ratio of accumulated FTC to accumulated PTC+FTC on the last token across all layers, motivated by a discrete Gronwall bound and by FTC-scaling experiments.

Key results

Measured effects reported in the paper

What was changedWhereMeasuredEffect
Increase the FTC scaling factor and select it to maximize agreementFTCα-Scaling · MWE behavioral evaluationsagreement: 1.55% to 5.18%Helped
Select the FTC scaling factor to minimize agreementFTCα-Scaling · MWE behavioral evaluationsagreement: -2.80% to -25.24%Hurt
Scale the fine-tuning component and optimize the factor per taskFTCα-Scaling · MMLUaccuracy: 1.03% to 2.69%Helped
Apply a GCG attack string to harmful promptsTuCo on safety-tuned models · Harmful prompts with GCG attacksTuCoHurt
Translate harmful prompts into low-resource languagesTuCo on safety-tuned models · Conjugate PromptingTuCoHurt
Add harmful behavior examples to the promptTuCo on safety-tuned models · Many-Shot JailbreakingTuCoHurt
Use prompts where jailbreak attacks succeed rather than failTuCo · Successful jailbreak promptsAUC for distinguishing successful prompts: 0.87 AUC for Llama 13BHelped
Use low-resource-language prompts rather than English promptsTuCo on Llama 2 13B · Conjugate PromptingTuCoHurt

Surprising findings

Limitations

Experimental setup

Datasets: OpenWebText HH-RLHF AdvBench MMLU Model-Written Evaluations

Benchmarks: MMLU Model-Written Evaluations AdvBench HH-RLHF OpenWebText

Metrics: AUC accuracy cross-validated accuracy change

Baselines: OutputCo

Builds on: transformer circuits many-shot jailbreaking greedy coordinate gradient conjugate prompting

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