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Does Low Rank Adaptation Lead to Lower Robustness against Training-Time Attacks?

ICML 2025 · Adversarial robustness and security › Backdoor and poisoning · approach: Backdoors in large multimodal models · 0 citations (OpenAlex)

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Theoretical NTK and information-geometry analysis of LoRA's training-time robustness, plus GLUE experiments with BERT-large, concluding LoRA is more vulnerable to untargeted label-flip poisoning but more robust to backdoor attacks than full fine-tuning.

Problem

Whether LoRA fine-tuning is more or less robust than full fine-tuning against training-time attacks such as data poisoning and backdoor attacks, which has been largely unstudied.

Approach

Defines training-time robustness via NTK-based gradient similarity and information geometry (information bits, Rényi entropy of the Fisher information). It shows that LoRA's low-rank A-matrix with small initialization variance yields a negative semi-definite NTK correction, so LoRA has smaller Fisher information and smoother geometry than full fine-tuning, which helps against backdoors but hurts a

Key results

Measured effects reported in the paper

What was changedWhereMeasuredEffect
Use LoRA instead of full fine-tuningBERT-large · GLUE tasks under untargeted poisoning attacksaccuracyHurt
Use LoRA instead of full fine-tuningBERT-large · GLUE tasks under backdoor attacksbackdoor resistanceHelped
Increase LoRA rank (ablation)LoRA · SST-2 under untargeted poisoningaccuracyHelped
Increase LoRA rank (ablation)LoRA · GLUE tasks under backdoor attacksbackdoor resistanceHurt
Vary LoRA initialization variance scale (ablation)LoRA · Clean GLUE datasetsperformanceNo clear effect
Vary LoRA initialization variance scale (ablation)LoRA · GLUE tasks under untargeted poisoningpoisoning robustnessNo clear effect
Use a smaller initialization variance for LoRA's A matrix (ablation)LoRA · GLUE tasks under backdoor attacksbackdoor resistanceHelped

Surprising findings

Limitations

Experimental setup

Datasets: SST-2 CoLA QNLI QQP RTE MRPC

Benchmarks: GLUE SST-2 CoLA QNLI QQP RTE MRPC

Metrics: accuracy F1 precision recall attack success rate

Baselines: full fine-tuning

Builds on: LoRA neural tangent kernel Fisher information Rényi entropy

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