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Byzantine-robust Decentralized Federated Learning via Dual-domain Clustering and Trust Bootstrapping

CVPR 2024 · Federated learning and privacy › Privacy attacks and secure learning · approach: Defending federated learning against poisoning · 28 citations (OpenAlex)

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Proposes DFL-Dual, a Byzantine-robust decentralized federated learning method that combines model-domain (Euclidean, cosine) and data-domain (Wasserstein over inverted dummy data) distances with two-stage clustering and trust bootstrapping to exclude malicious neighbors, even when they exceed half.

Problem

Byzantine attacks in decentralized federated learning, where malicious clients may outnumber benign clients in a benign client's neighborhood and data is highly non-IID, make existing robust aggregation defenses fail.

Approach

Benign clients compute dual-domain distances (Euclidean distance between pre-aggregation models plus Wasserstein distance between dummy datasets obtained by a DLG-style model inversion with scaled equivalent gradients), then run two rounds of 2-median clustering, with a cosine-similarity-based trust score choosing which cluster to keep at each stage.

Key results

Measured effects reported in the paper

What was changedWhereMeasuredEffect
Use dual-domain client clustering and trust bootstrapping rather than the evaluated robust aggregation baselinesDFL-Dual · Untargeted attacks across MNIST, Fashion-MNIST, and CIFAR-10accuracy (%)Helped
Use DFL-Dual for targeted Scaling attacksDFL-Dual · MNIST, Fashion-MNIST, and CIFAR-10ASR (%): 0.50; 1.70; 4.44Helped
Use DFL-Dual for targeted A Little is Enough attacksDFL-Dual · MNIST, Fashion-MNIST, and CIFAR-10ASR (%): 0.55; 2.16; 4.78Helped
Use DFL-Dual for targeted DBA attacksDFL-Dual · MNIST, Fashion-MNIST, and CIFAR-10ASR (%): 0.48; 2.53; 4.35Helped
Add model-domain Euclidean distance to first-stage clustering (ablation)DFL-Dual · Targeted attacks across MNIST, Fashion-MNIST, and CIFAR-10accuracy (%): 96.82 vs 96.21; 85.16 vs 84.83; 36.85 vs 49.01 (Scaling)Mixed
Add model-domain Euclidean distance to first-stage clustering (ablation)DFL-Dual · Targeted attacks across MNIST, Fashion-MNIST, and CIFAR-10ASR (%): 31.61 vs 4.44 (CIFAR10 Scaling); 9.01 vs 4.35 (CIFAR10 DBA)Mixed
Add data-domain Wasserstein distance to first-stage clustering (ablation)DFL-Dual · Targeted attacks across MNIST, Fashion-MNIST, and CIFAR-10accuracy (%): 14.73 vs 84.83 (Fashion Scaling); 12.38 vs 96.54 (MNIST DBA)Helped
Add data-domain Wasserstein distance to first-stage clustering (ablation)DFL-Dual · Targeted attacks across MNIST, Fashion-MNIST, and CIFAR-10ASR (%): 21.02 vs 1.70 (Fashion Scaling); 3.76 vs 4.35 (CIFAR10 DBA)Mixed
Add trust bootstrapping for cluster selection (ablation)DFL-Dual · Targeted attacks across MNIST, Fashion-MNIST, and CIFAR-10accuracy (%): 75.60 vs 96.21 (MNIST Scaling); 30.99 vs 84.83 (Fashion Scaling)Helped
Add trust bootstrapping for cluster selection (ablation)DFL-Dual · Targeted attacks across MNIST, Fashion-MNIST, and CIFAR-10ASR (%): 95.23 vs 0.50 (MNIST Scaling); 46.31 vs 1.70 (Fashion Scaling)Helped

Surprising findings

Limitations

Experimental setup

Datasets: MNIST Fashion-MNIST CIFAR-10

Benchmarks: MNIST Fashion-MNIST CIFAR-10

Metrics: accuracy attack success rate

Baselines: DFL DFLTrust DFLDetector Multi-Krum BridgeM IOS

Builds on: DLG FLTrust Krum FLDetector IOS

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