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Research map / Multi-agent systems and games / Games and equilibria

Iterative Calculus of Voting under Plurality

AAAI 2022 · Multi-agent systems and games › Games and equilibria · approach: Fair division and coalition formation · 2 citations (OpenAlex)

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Measured effects reported in the paper

What was changedWhereMeasuredEffect
Use iterative expected-utility updates with plurality pivotal probabilitiesICV · Non-atomic plurality electionsconvergenceHelped
Use ICV in large electoratesICV · Electorates as N → ∞convergence probabilityHelped
Use ICV in large electoratesICV · Electorates as N → ∞Strong Duvergerian Equilibrium probabilityHelped
Use Skellam pivotal probabilities instead of exact alternativesICV · ICV simulationsconvergence: 63 of 10, 000 runsHurt
Increase electorate sizeICV · ICV simulationsStrong Duvergerian Equilibrium rate: more than 30 agentsHelped
Use Poisson or Skellam pivotal probabilities instead of Multinomial probabilitiesICV · ICV simulations with N > 25election-winner agreement: N > 25No clear effect
Approximate Poisson pivotal probabilities with Skellam pivotal probabilitiesICV · ICV simulationsruntimeNo clear effect
Use Multinomial pivotal probabilities instead of Poisson or Skellam probabilitiesICV · ICV simulationsruntimeHurt

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