Research map / Adversarial robustness and security / Backdoor and poisoning
Clean-Label Backdoor Attacks on Video Recognition Models
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Measured effects reported in the paper
| What was changed | Where | Measured | Effect |
|---|---|---|---|
| Replace the transferred clean-label image attack with a universal adversarial trigger and targeted perturbation | I3D · UCF-101 | attack success rate (%): 1.1 -> 82.2 | Helped |
| Add a universal adversarial trigger rather than a fixed or randomly sampled trigger (ablation) | I3D with targeted perturbation · UCF-101 | attack success rate (%): 0.0 -> 82.2; 0.0 -> 82.2 | Helped |
| Add a universal adversarial trigger rather than a fixed or randomly sampled trigger (ablation) | I3D with targeted perturbation · HMDB-51 | attack success rate (%): 1.4 -> 81.0; 4.1 -> 81.0 | Helped |
| Add targeted adversarial perturbation to the universal adversarial trigger (ablation) | I3D · UCF-101 | attack success rate (%): 61.1 -> 82.2 | Helped |
| Add uniform adversarial perturbation to the universal adversarial trigger (ablation) | I3D · UCF-101 | attack success rate (%): 61.1 -> 76.9 | Helped |
| Add targeted adversarial perturbation to the universal adversarial trigger (ablation) | I3D · HMDB-51 | attack success rate (%): 69.2 -> 81.0 | Helped |
| Add uniform adversarial perturbation to the universal adversarial trigger (ablation) | I3D · HMDB-51 | attack success rate (%): 69.2 -> 81.7 | Helped |
| Increase trigger size from 16 to 28 (ablation) | Proposed video backdoor attack · UCF-101 | attack success rate (%): 61.2 -> 93.7 | Helped |
| Use optical flow alongside RGB input (ablation) | I3D two-stream network · UCF-101 | attack success rate (%): 68.5 -> 54.7 | Hurt |
| Apply the attack to optical-flow input rather than RGB input (ablation) | I3D · UCF-101 | attack success rate (%): 68.5 -> 15.2 | Hurt |
| Train with data augmentation (ablation) | Proposed video backdoor attack · UCF-101 | attack success rate (%): 56.3% | Hurt |
| Increase poisoning percentage beyond the reported 20%–70% range (ablation) | Proposed video backdoor attack · UCF-101 | attack success rate (%): nearly 0% | Hurt |
Closest papers by meaning
- Clean-image Backdoor: Attacking Multi-label Models with Poisoned Labels Only (ICLR 2023 · similarity 0.93)
- Hidden Trigger Backdoor Attacks (AAAI 2020 · similarity 0.92)
- Temporal-Distributed Backdoor Attack against Video Based Action Recognition (AAAI 2024 · similarity 0.91)
- Wicked Oddities: Selectively Poisoning for Effective Clean-Label Backdoor Attacks (ICLR 2025 · similarity 0.91)
- A Theoretical Analysis of Backdoor Poisoning Attacks in Convolutional Neural Networks (ICML 2024 · similarity 0.90)
- Adversarial-Inspired Backdoor Defense via Bridging Backdoor and Adversarial Attacks (AAAI 2025 · similarity 0.89)
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