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Pixel Is Not a Barrier: An Effective Evasion Attack for Pixel-Domain Diffusion Models

AAAI 2025 · Image generation › Editing and style transfer · approach: Inversion-based diffusion editing · 2 citations (OpenAlex)

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Proposes AtkPDM, an evasion attack that perturbs images via a UNet mid-block feature Wasserstein loss plus a VAE latent optimization to protect them from SDEdit-based editing by pixel-domain diffusion models.

Problem

Protecting images from SDEdit-based editing by pixel-domain diffusion models (PDMs), which prior adversarial protection methods designed for latent diffusion models (LDMs) fail to attack effectively.

Approach

Attack the denoising UNet's intermediate feature distributions by maximizing a closed-form 2-Wasserstein distance between clean and adversarial noisy features, constrain fidelity with a VGG16 feature Wasserstein loss, and optimize in the latent space of a model-agnostic Stable Diffusion VAE to improve naturalness.

Key results

Measured effects reported in the paper

What was changedWhereMeasuredEffect
Replace semantic loss with feature-space attack loss, using the full AtkPDM method (ablation)PDM image protection · ChurchLPIPS (attack effectiveness): 0.17 ± 0.09 -> 0.40 ± 0.05Helped
Add latent optimization via VAE to AtkPDM (ablation)AtkPDM · ChurchLPIPS (adversarial image quality): 0.26 ± 0.04 -> 0.13 ± 0.02Helped
Add latent optimization via VAE to AtkPDM (ablation)AtkPDM · ChurchLPIPS (attack effectiveness): 0.40 ± 0.05 -> 0.33 ± 0.07Hurt
Add latent optimization via VAE to semantic-loss attack (ablation)Semantic-loss method · ChurchLPIPS (adversarial image quality): 0.73 ± 0.16 -> 0.17 ± 0.03Helped
Add latent optimization via VAE to semantic-loss attack (ablation)Semantic-loss method · ChurchLPIPS (attack effectiveness): 0.17 ± 0.09 -> 0.15 ± 0.06No clear effect
Add fidelity loss to semantic-loss attack with VAE (ablation)Semantic-loss method with VAE · ChurchLPIPS (attack effectiveness): 0.15 ± 0.06 -> 0.08 ± 0.03Hurt
Use feature attack and fidelity loss instead of semantic loss with VAE (ablation)PDM image protection · ChurchLPIPS (attack effectiveness): 0.08 ± 0.03 -> 0.40 ± 0.05Helped

Surprising findings

Limitations

Experimental setup

Datasets: Church Cat CelebA-HQ

Benchmarks: Church Cat Face (CelebA-HQ)

Metrics: SSIM PSNR LPIPS Image Alignment (IA)

Baselines: AdvDM Diff-Protect Mist PhotoGuard

Builds on: AdvDM Diff-Protect PhotoGuard Mist MPGD

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