AI Paper Atlas

Research map / Learning theory and algorithms / Submodular and game algorithms

Rank Maximal Equal Contribution: A Probabilistic Social Choice Function

Haris Aziz, Pang Luo, Christine Rizkallah

AAAI 2018 · Learning theory and algorithms › Submodular and game algorithms · approach: Committee voting rules · 8 citations (OpenAlex)

Read the paperCheck your idea against 137,217 papers

AI-extracted. The measured effects below were read by AI from the paper's full text (no summary yet). Numbers and claims can be wrong or missing context, so check the paper before you cite or build on it.

Measured effects reported in the paper

What was changedWhereMeasuredEffect
Use rank-maximal equal contributions, with each agent allocating an equal share among their top alternatives having the best rank vectorRMEC · Profiles with 4 agents and 4 alternativesSD-efficiencyImproved
Use rank-maximal equal contributionsRMEC · Random profiles with 4–8 alternatives and 4–8 agentsSD-efficiencyImproved
Use rank-maximal equal contributionsRMEC · Weak-order profilesVery strong SD-participationImproved
Use rank-maximal equal contributionsRMEC · Weak-order profilesEx post efficiencyImproved
Use RMEC instead of RSDProbabilistic social choice · Profiles where the RSD outcome is SD-efficientSD-efficiencyNo clear effect
Use RMEC instead of RSDFour-agent, four-alternative example profile · Example preference profileSD-efficiencyImproved
Replace rank-maximal selection with choosing a most-preferred Pareto-optimal alternative (ablation)RMEC variant · Five-agent example preference profileStrong SD-participationHurt
Replace rank-maximal selection with uniform choice among most-preferred Pareto-optimal alternatives (ablation)RMEC variant · Five-agent example preference profileStrong SD-participationHurt
Use rank-maximal equal contributionsRMEC · Weak-order profilesSD-efficiencyHurt
Misreport preferences by changing the reported rankingRMEC, agent 1 · Three-agent example preference profileSD preference of the manipulating agent: 1/3 a + 1/3 d + 1/3 e -> 1/3 a + 1/3 c + 1/3 eImproved
Require SD-uniformity in addition to very strong SD-participationAny PSCF · Social choice profilesCompatibility of axiomsHurt

Closest papers by meaning

Writing a paper in this area? scime draft is a free LaTeX editor with AI included, real-time co-authors and a check of your references and venue rules before you submit. It also imports OpenAI Prism projects.

Open scime draft

Get the next scime Dispatch and a monthly field update

Free. We send a confirmation link first; every email has a one-click unsubscribe. Privacy