Research map / Learning theory and algorithms / Submodular and game algorithms
Rank Maximal Equal Contribution: A Probabilistic Social Choice Function
Haris Aziz, Pang Luo, Christine Rizkallah
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AI-extracted. The measured effects below were read by AI from the paper's full text (no summary yet). Numbers and claims can be wrong or missing context, so check the paper before you cite or build on it.
Measured effects reported in the paper
| What was changed | Where | Measured | Effect |
|---|---|---|---|
| Use rank-maximal equal contributions, with each agent allocating an equal share among their top alternatives having the best rank vector | RMEC · Profiles with 4 agents and 4 alternatives | SD-efficiency | Improved |
| Use rank-maximal equal contributions | RMEC · Random profiles with 4–8 alternatives and 4–8 agents | SD-efficiency | Improved |
| Use rank-maximal equal contributions | RMEC · Weak-order profiles | Very strong SD-participation | Improved |
| Use rank-maximal equal contributions | RMEC · Weak-order profiles | Ex post efficiency | Improved |
| Use RMEC instead of RSD | Probabilistic social choice · Profiles where the RSD outcome is SD-efficient | SD-efficiency | No clear effect |
| Use RMEC instead of RSD | Four-agent, four-alternative example profile · Example preference profile | SD-efficiency | Improved |
| Replace rank-maximal selection with choosing a most-preferred Pareto-optimal alternative (ablation) | RMEC variant · Five-agent example preference profile | Strong SD-participation | Hurt |
| Replace rank-maximal selection with uniform choice among most-preferred Pareto-optimal alternatives (ablation) | RMEC variant · Five-agent example preference profile | Strong SD-participation | Hurt |
| Use rank-maximal equal contributions | RMEC · Weak-order profiles | SD-efficiency | Hurt |
| Misreport preferences by changing the reported ranking | RMEC, agent 1 · Three-agent example preference profile | SD preference of the manipulating agent: 1/3 a + 1/3 d + 1/3 e -> 1/3 a + 1/3 c + 1/3 e | Improved |
| Require SD-uniformity in addition to very strong SD-participation | Any PSCF · Social choice profiles | Compatibility of axioms | Hurt |
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