Research map / Multi-agent systems and games / Games and equilibria
Mechanism Design for Multi-Type Housing Markets
Sujoy Sikdar, Sibel Adali, Lirong Xia
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AI-extracted. The measured effects below were read by AI from the paper's full text (no summary yet). Numbers and claims can be wrong or missing context, so check the paper before you cite or build on it.
Measured effects reported in the paper
| What was changed | Where | Measured | Effect |
|---|---|---|---|
| Use MTTC for allocating items under lexicographic preferences | Multi-type housing markets · Lexicographic preferences with possibly different importance orders and CP-net structures | strict-core selection | Improved |
| Use MTTC for allocating items under lexicographic preferences | Multi-type housing markets · Lexicographic preferences | non-bossiness | Improved |
| Use MTTC while agents cannot misreport importance orders | Multi-type housing markets · Lexicographic preferences | group strategy-proofness | Improved |
| Allow agents to misreport their importance order | MTTC · Lexicographic preferences | strategy-proofness | Hurt |
| Require individual rationality and Pareto optimality | Mechanisms for multi-type housing markets · Separable lexicographic preferences; n ≥ 3 and p ≥ 2 | strategy-proofness | Hurt |
| Check whether a given allocation belongs to the strict core | InStrictCore · Separable lexicographic preferences over p ≥ 2 types | computational complexity | Hurt |
| Check whether the strict core is non-empty | StrictCoreNonEmpty · Multi-type housing markets | computational complexity | Hurt |
| Allow multiple strict-core allocations | Multi-type housing markets · Separable lexicographic preferences with a common importance order | strict-core uniqueness | Hurt |
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