Research map / Learning theory and algorithms / Submodular and game algorithms
Strategy-Proof and Non-Wasteful Multi-Unit Auction via Social Network
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Measured effects reported in the paper
| What was changed | Where | Measured | Effect |
|---|---|---|---|
| Use the distance-based mechanism instead of ND-VCG | Multi-unit unit-demand auction via social network · All buyer networks and type profiles | social surplus | Helped |
| Use the distance-based mechanism instead of FCFS-F | Multi-unit unit-demand auction via social network · All buyer networks and type profiles | social surplus | Helped |
| Use the distance-based mechanism instead of ND-VCG | Multi-unit unit-demand auction via social network · All buyer networks and type profiles | seller revenue | Helped |
| Use the distance-based mechanism instead of FCFS-F | Multi-unit unit-demand auction via social network · All buyer networks and type profiles | seller revenue | Helped |
| Use the distance-based mechanism rather than ND-VCG or FCFS-F | Buyer truth-telling incentives · Multi-unit unit-demand auction via social network, k >= 2 | incentive for truthful reporting | Helped |
| Add a reserve price v_h = bar(v)/2 (ablation) | Distance-based mechanism · Worst-case efficiency | alpha-inefficiency: 1/2 | Helped |
| Add any non-zero reserve price (ablation) | Distance-based mechanism · All buyer networks and type profiles | non-wastefulness | Hurt |
| Allow the seller to choose which direct buyers receive the auction information | Distance-based mechanism · Optimal Diffusion | computational complexity | Hurt |
| Send information to all direct buyers rather than a selected subset | Distance-based mechanism · Seller revenue | seller revenue: 12; 15 | Mixed |
| Use the distance-based mechanism, which prioritizes buyers by distance from the seller | Multi-unit unit-demand auction via social network · All buyer networks and type profiles | follower revenue monotonicity: 12; 15 | Hurt |
Closest papers by meaning
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